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systems in MENA countries must be embedded within a sound institutional framework.
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The fundamental economic growth question, which has
preoccupied researchers, is why countries grow at different
rates. Addressing this question, an important strand of litera-
ture paid special attention to the role of the financial system in
the growth process. On the theoretical side, an important
battery of models articulates mechanisms through which the
financial system affects economic growth (e.g. King & Levine,
1993a, 1993b; McKinnon, 1973; Pagano, 1993; Shaw, 1973).
These studies support Schumpeter's view which emphasizes* Corresponding author. Umm Al-Qura University, Saudi Arabia.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).the positive role of financial development in determining
economic growth.
However, by declaring that “where enterprise leads finance
follows” Robinson (1952, p. 86) provided a skeptical view
stressing that financial development followed economic
growth. This view was echoed by Lucas (1988) who believed
that the financeegrowth relationship was unimportant. Hence,
he asserted that economists tended to overemphasize the role
of financial factors in economic growth. Theory provides, also,
conflicting predictions about the role of different sub-
components of the financial system on economic growth.
Some theories emphasize the relevance of the banking system
on economic growth, while others highlight the benefits of
stock markets (Allen & Gale, 1999; Boot & Thakor, 1997).
On the empirical side, by using different econometric
methodologies, empirical results provide evidence that a rangeting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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economic growth.1
Our research extends previous evidences by investigating
the conditional financeegrowth relationship in Middle East
and North African (MENA) countries. Specifically, we
examine whether the financeegrowth nexus is affected by
institutional quality. In fact, as identified by North (1990),
institutions are “the rules of the games in a society”. These
include both “formal” rules such as constitutions and laws
enforced by the state and “informal” constraints such as
“codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions”
which, generally, are enforced by the members of the relevant
group (North, 1990, p. 36). “In consideration of all these as-
pects, institutions ensure, define and steer the functioning of
market and non-market-activities” (Balzat, 2006, p. 20).
Therefore, when either the rules change frequently or are not
respected, markets do not function well. A number of papers
(Knack & Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Rodrik, Subramanian,
& Trebbi, 2002) supported the key role played by institu-
tional quality in promoting economic performance. These
findings are supported by Bonnal and Yaya (2015).
For the MENA region, Ben Naceur, Cherif, and Khandil's
recent study (2014) showed that Institutional quality, particu-
larly rule of law, promoted financial development by signaling
confidence in the quality of the legal system in support of
economic activity. Gazdar and Cherif's (2015) latest results
supported that institutional quality played an important role in
the MENA's financial system. However, this role is more
relevant for the banking sector than for stock market
development.
The main reasons, which motivated us to choose the MENA
countries to perform our empirical investigations, were that
few studies focused on this region. In addition, and these
studies' main findings were that, while MENA countries had
embarked on financial reforms since the mid-1980s, financial
development had not worked as an engine of economic
development in this region (Ben Naceur & Ghazouani, 2007).
Over the past two decades or so, the growth performance of
the MENA region has been rather disappointing. As a whole,
the region experienced the weakest real per capita growth
performance amongst all regions worldwide (Bhattacharya &
Wolde, 2010; Nabli & Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2004). One
possible reason for these results is that the relationship be-
tween financial development and economic growth may not be
linear, but rather be dependent simply on the conditions like
institutional quality. In fact, an increase in financial deepening,
as captured by standard indicators of financial development,
may not result in increased growth because of corruption in
the banking system or political interference. These may divert
credit to unproductive or even wasteful activities (Demetriades
& Law, 2006).1 The early empirical evidences include: King and Levine (1993a, 1993b),
Goldsmith (1969), and Atje and Jovanovic (1993). The recent empirical evi-
dences include: Beck and Levine (2004), Demetriades and Law (2006), Hasan,
Wachtel, and Zhou (2009a, 2009b), and Hassan, Sanchez, and Yu (2011).We re-investigate how financial development affects the
economic growth in MENA countries. Specifically, we
examine how the responsiveness of economic growth to
financial development depends upon the indicator of institu-
tional quality. Our contribution consists of determining an
institutional threshold beyond which financial development
can accelerate economic growth. Specifically, we aim to
calculate the minimum level of institutional quality that must
be attained by MENA countries to benefit from financial
development in terms of economic growth.
An empirical model with linear interaction between finan-
cial development and institutional quality is estimated. As
econometric methodology, we use the GMM estimators
developed for dynamic panel data for a sample of 18 MENA
countries over the period from 1984 to 2007. Our main find-
ings show that, while most indicators of financial development
have a significantly negative effect on economic growth, the
sign of the coefficients of interaction variables are significantly
positive. This provides strong evidence that institutional
quality mitigates the negative effect of financial development
on economic growth. These results are in line with
Demetriades and Law's (2006) findings.
The rest of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 re-
views the literature exploring the connection between financial
development and economic growth. Section 3 describes the
data and presents the empirical methodology. Section 4 reports
the main results. Section 5 reports the conclusion.
2. Literature review
In the theoretical Arrow-Debreu World, characterized by a
state-contingent claim framework with no information or
transaction costs, there is no need for a financial system “that
expends resources researching projects, scrutinizing man-
agers, or designing arrangements to ease risk management
and facilitate transaction” (Levine, 1997, p. 690). A financial
system becomes essential once frictions are introduced in the
Arrow-Debreu model. Therefore, financial intermediaries and
markets emerge to ameliorate the problems of asymmetric
information and high transaction costs. The ability of the
financial system to relax these frictions can lead to facilitating
the allocation of resources over space and time (Levine, 1997,
2005; Merton & Bodie, 1995). Thus, in easing information,
enforcement, and transactions costs, financial systems provide
five broad categories of services to the economy. In a couple of
papers, Levine (1997, 2005) classified the functions of finan-
cial systems into the following five categories: (1) producing
information and allocation of capital; (2) monitoring firms
exerting corporate control; (3) risk amelioration; (4) pooling of
savings; and (5) easing exchange.
Theoreticians hold different perspectives on the link be-
tween financial developments and economic growth. While, as
an important extension, the earliest theoretical studies focused
on the effect of financial development on economic growth,
some studies were interested in the relative merits of a bank-
based financial system and a market-based financial system
on economic growth. Another strand of studies extended, also,
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nexus.
The notable early works on finance and development along
the Schumpeterian lines include Gurley and Shaw (1955) and
Goldsmith (1969). They argued that financial development
was crucial in determining economic growth.
Building on the work of Schumpeter, McKinnon (1973) and
Shaw (1973) propounded the ‘financial liberalization’ thesis in
1973 by suggesting that a higher level of financial develop-
ment, which could be the result of financial liberalization,
would lead to increased output growth. They argued that the
financial sector could raise the volume of savings as well as
the quantity and quality of investment. In the early 1990s the
endogenous financial development and growth models2
emerged. These models point out that financial development
leads to long-run economic growth. Similarly, financial
distortion reduces the rate of economic growth.
Building on the theoretical evidence, there emerged a
number of empirical studies which focused on examining the
relationship between financial development and economic
growth. These studies proceeded from using country-level
data, to using industry and firm-level data. The econometric
methodologies on this subject can be categorized broadly into
the following four groups (i) pure cross-country, (ii) instru-
mental variable, (iii) times series; and (iv) firm and household-
level approaches.
Empirical investigations on the relationship between
finance and growth come back to the seminal contribution of
Goldsmith (1969). He sought to assess whether or not finance
exerted a causal influence on growth and whether or not the
mixture of markets and intermediaries operating in an econ-
omy influenced it. To this end, for 35 countries over the period
from 1860 to 1963, he considered data on the assets of
financial intermediaries relative to GNP and data on the sum of
net issues of bonds and securities plus changes in loans rela-
tive to GNP. Applying both OLS and graphical analysis,
Goldsmith (1969) found a clear relationship between financial
development and economic growth. However, as cited in
Levine (1997, p. 704) and Levine (2005, p. 40) this study
suffered from several weaknesses. Thus, several researchers
took steps to address some of these caveats. King and Levine
(1993a) adopted a sample of 77 countries over the period from
1960 to 1989 and controlled for other factors affecting long-
run growth. Their study's findings provide some support for
the Schumpeterian viewdthat finance matters for growth.
King and Levine (1993b) confirmed, also, this finding. In fact,
using alternative econometric methods and considering both
the financial and growth indicators defined by King and
Levine (1993a) for a sample of 80 countries, King and
Levine (1993b) found that financial development promoted
economic growth.
While the above cited studies focused on the financee-
growth relationship through the impact of the banking sector
on economic growth, an important strand of studies attempted2 Pagano (1993), King and Levine (1993b), and Bencivenga, Smith, and
Starr (1995).to examine the role of stock markets on economic growth.
These studies started with the contribution of Atje and
Jovanovic (1993) who investigated the impact of both stock
markets and bank on economic growth. Based on annual ob-
servations for 94 countries over the period from 1960 to 1985
and using an OLS analysis, Atje and Jovanovic (1993) found
that while stock markets had both positive levels and growth
effects on economic activity, they failed to find a similar effect
for bank lending. Building on Atje and Jovanovic's (1993)
study, Levine and Zervos (1998) examined whether or not
banking and stock market indicators both correlated robustly
with current and future rates of economic growth, capital
accumulation, productivity improvements and private savings.
Applying the OLS technique of estimation to a sample of 49
countries for the period from 1960 to 1989, Levine and Zervos
(1998) found that while stock market liquidity correlated
positively and significantly with current and future rates of
economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity
growth, stock market size, volatility, and integration were not
linked robustly with growth. Their findings show, also, that the
initial levels of both stock market liquidity and banking sector
development predict future rates of growth, capital accumu-
lation, and productivity growth.
To overcome the biases related to OLS, the classical
approach, adopted in cross-country growth regressions, is to
identify an instrumental variable which explains cross-country
differences in financial development but is uncorrelated with
economic growth beyond its link with financial development
and other growth determinants. Therefore, in contrast to
traditional cross-country investigations, Levine (1998) exam-
ined whether or not cross-country variations in the exogenous
component of banking sector development explained cross-
country variations in the rate of economic development.
Thus, he used the legal determinants of banking development
as instrumental variables for the banking sector development
indicator. As a result, he found that the exogenous component
of banking development was associated positively with all
indicators of economic growth. In line with Levine (1998),
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) found that the exogenous
component of financial intermediary development was asso-
ciated positively with economic growth.
To account explicitly for biases induced by the inclusion of
the lagged dependent variable and to control for the potential
endogeneity of all explanatory variables, researchers utilized
dynamic panel regressions as an alternative to cross-sectional
Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions. To our knowledge,
Levine (1999), Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), Beck, Levine,
and Norman (2000), Levine et al. (2000) were among the
first studies to use the dynamic panel analysis. More specif-
ically they considered the Generalized Method-of-Moments
(GMM) estimators developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and
Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and
Bover (1995). Moreover, besides the traditional cross-section
instrumental variable procedures (described above), Levine
et al. (2000) used the recent dynamic panel techniques “sys-
tem estimator” to examine the relationship between financial
intermediary and growth. As with the traditional cross-section,
140 K. Gazdar, M. Cherif / Borsa _Istanbul Review 15-3 (2015) 137e160the results of dynamic panel data show that exogenous
changes in financial intermediary development imply large
changes in economic growth. Constructing a panel dataset
with data averaged over each of the seven 5-year periods be-
tween 1960 and 1995 and considering the GMM panel esti-
mator together, they provided a strong positive relationship
between financial intermediary and both economic growth and
total factor productivity growth. In the same vein Beck and
Levine (2004) examined the relationship between growth
and both stock markets and bank development. Their findings
show that stock markets and banks have positive and signifi-
cant effects on economic growth and that these effects are not
due to potential biases induced by simultaneity, omitted vari-
ables or unobserved country-specific effects.
In a more recent paper, Kar, Nazlıoglu, and Agır (2011)
examined the financeegrowth nexus in MENA countries.
Specifically they examined the direction of causality between
finance and growth. To this end, they applied the recently
proposed panel causality testing approach which takes into
account cross-sectional dependence across countries. Using a
sample of 15 MENA countries over the period from 1980 to
2007, they found that, for all measurements of financial
development, there was no clear consensus on the direction of
causality between financial development and economic growth
and they observed, also, that the findings were country and
financial development specific.
Hasan et al. (2009a, 2009b) contributed to this line of
research by analyzing, specifically in China, the role of legal
institutions, financial deepening and political pluralism on
growth rates at the regional level. The results show that while
capital market, legal environment, awareness of property
rights and political pluralism have a strong influence on
growth, the impact of bank lending is insignificant and is
sometimes negative.
To investigate the finance and growth relationship, Loayza
and Ranciere (2006) and Demetriades and Law (2006) adopted
the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimators proposed by
Pesaran, Yongcheol, and Ron (1999) with its advantage of
controlling for country heterogeneity in the financeegrowth
nexus. Using a sample of 75 countries and annual data for the
period from 1960 to 2000 and based on the PMG estimator,
Loayza and Ranciere (2006) found that while financial inter-
mediation had a positive and significant effect on economic
growth in the long run, this effect was significantly negative in
the short run. Demetriades and Law (2006) used data from 72
countries for the period from 1976 to 2000 and adopted both
cross-section and panel data econometric methods (MG and
PMG). Their findings provide evidence that financial devel-
opment has an important effect on GDP per capita when the
financial system is embedded within a sound institutional
framework.
Christopoulos and Tsionas' (2004) study was the first
contribution to the financeegrowth relationship literature
which employed panel data co-integration techniques. Using
a sample of 10 developing countries over the period from
1970 to 2000, their empirical results support the hypothesis
that the only co-integrating relationship impliesunidirectional causality from financial depth to growth.
Apergis, Filippidis, and Economidou (2007) contributed to
the relevant literature by using a large and heterogenous
sample of 65 countries over the period from 1975 to 2000.
Applying the panel co-integration techniques developed by
Pedroni (1999), Apergis et al. (2007) provide evidence that
there is a strong, positive and statistically significant equi-
librium relationship between financial development and
economic growth. Also, they point out that there is a strong
bi-directional causality between financial development and
economic growth.
In a time series setting, Ghirmay (2005) explored the causal
links between financial development and economic growth in
a sample of 13 sub-Saharan African countries. He found that
there was a long-run relationship between financial develop-
ment and economic growth in almost all (12 out of 13) of the
countries. Again in eight of the countries, the evidence points
to the causality running from financial development to eco-
nomic growth.
In this vein Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008) examined, for
the period from 1960 to 2004, the causal relationship between
financial development and economic growth for six Middle
Eastern and North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel,
Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia). This study took steps to address
some of the weaknesses of the previous empirical analysis of
the causality between financial development and economic
growth in MENA countries. Unlike most of the previous
studies which were based on a bivariate VAR analysis, Abu-
Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008) applied a quadvariate Vector
Autoregressive (VAR) system to overcome the mis-
specification bias. In five out of the six countries, the empirical
results point to the unidirectional causality running from
financial development to economic growth. This causality ran
through enhancing investment efficiency rather than through
enhancing capital accumulation.
In the case of Greece, Hondroyiannis, Lolos, and
Papapetrou (2005) examined, over the period from 1986 to
1999, the relationship between the development of the banking
system and stock market and economic performance.
Applying VAR models, their findings show that, although their
effects are small, both bank and stock market financing can
promote economic growth in the long run. However, compared
to bank finance, the contribution of the stock market to growth
is limited; this can be explained by the minor role played
traditionally by the stock market in Greece.
Thangavelu and James (2004) examined empirically the
dynamic relationship between financial development and
economic growth in Australia in terms of bank-based and
market-based financial structure. Therefore, to estimate the
relationship, Thangavelu and James (2004) employed time
series methodology using a VAR model and the Granger
causality test. Using quarterly data, the time span of this study
covered the period from 1960 to 1999. Their results suggest
that financial intermediaries (bank-based system) and financial
markets (market-based system) tend to have different roles in
promoting growth in an economy. Indeed, using financial in-
termediaries' indicators, the empirical results are consistent
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promotes financial development. However, the results of using
financial market indicators are consistent with Schumpeter's
view that a market-based system promotes economic growth
in the Australian economy.
An important strand of empirical studies examined the non-
linear relationship between financial and economic develop-
ment. In fact, these studies suggested that the financeegrowth
relationship was very likely to be nonlinear in the sense that
the growth effect of finance might vary with alternative
macroeconomic and institutional conditions. Applying a
threshold regression model to King and Levine's (1993b)
dataset which covered 119 countries over the period from
1960 to 1989, Deiddaa and Fattouh (2002) examined empir-
ically the non-linear relationship between financial and eco-
nomic development. Their results provide evidence consistent
with the non-monotonic relationship implied by their empir-
ical model. There is no significant relationship between
financial depth and economic growth in low income countries.
Using a sample of 74 countries over the period from 1960 to
1995 and applying the GMM dynamic panel data techniques,
Rioja and Valev's (2004) results support the non-linear rela-
tionship between financial development and economic growth
view.
To characterize how inflation affects the influence of
finance on growth, Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) applied the
rolling panel data regression technique to a sample of 84
countries from 1960 to 1995. The study provides evidence that
there is an inflation threshold for the financeegrowth rela-
tionship. In fact, when inflation exceeds the 13e25% range,
financial deepening fails to increase the level of economic
growth. In a more recent study, Huang, Lin, Kim, and Yeh
(2010) explored whether or not there existed an inflation
threshold in the finance growth nexus. To this end, they
employed the threshold regression with the instrumental var-
iables of Caner and Hansen (2004). Using Levine et al.'s
(2000) dataset, they found strong evidence of a nonlinear
inflation threshold in the financeegrowth, below which
financial development exerted a significantly positive effect on
economic growth, while above which the growth effect of
finance appeared to be insignificant. In a similar vein,
Demetriades and Law (2006) investigated the effect of in-
stitutions on the financeegrowth nexus. Applying both a
cross-sectional estimation and a panel data estimation to a
sample of 72 countries for the period from 1978 to 2000,
Demetriades and Law (2006) found that financial development
had a larger effect on long-run economic development when
the financial system was embedded within a sound institu-
tional framework. However, if institutional quality is low,
more finance may not generate a significant benefit in eco-
nomic growth. Our study relates to this last study's objecti-
vedexamining the effect of institutional quality on the
financeegrowth nexusdand, also, the adoption of the empir-
ical model with interaction variables. However, our study
differs from previous work by determining an institutional
threshold beyond which financial development can accelerate
economic growth.3. Method3.1. Econometric modelAn empirical specification, which allows one to test the
responsiveness of economic growth to financial development,
depends up on an indicator of institutional quality and has the
following form:
GROWTHit ¼aiþ b0FDit þ b1ðFDit*INSTitÞ
þ4INSTit þ gZit þ 3it
ð1Þ
where GROWTHit refers to the growth of real per capita GDP
in the ith country for some time-period, this is our measure of
economic growth. FDit includes variables which measure
stock markets and banking development, Zit represents a ma-
trix of control variables, ai is an unobserved country specific
effect, and 3it is the error term of each observation.
Equation (1) permits us to assess whether or not financial
development has a different influence on growth in countries
with high values of institutional quality and countries with low
values. In this specification, the responsiveness of the steady
state level of economic growth to financial development is
d (equation (2)). Specifically, differentiate equation (1) with
respect to financial development to obtain the marginal effect
of financial development on economic growth:
d¼ vGROWTH
vFD
¼ b0þ b1*INST ð2Þ
Our conditional hypotheses center around the coefficients
b0 and b1. Four possibilities are created. They are:
 If b0 > 0 and b1 > 0, financial development has a positive
impact on economic growth and institutional conditions
affect favorably that positive impact.
 If b0 > 0 and b1 < 0, financial development has a positive
impact on economic growth and institutional conditions
affect adversely that positive impact (institutional quality
lessens this positive effect).
 If b0 < 0 and b1 > 0, financial development has a negative
impact on economic growth and institutional conditions
mitigate the negative effect of financial development.
 If b0 < 0 and b1 < 0, financial development has a
negative impact on economic growth and institutional
conditions aggravate the negative effect of financial
development.
Equation (2) allows us to calculate the threshold level of
institutional quality beyond which financial development can
accelerate economic growth. Thus, the positive effect of
financial development on economic growth is observed when:
Therefore, the threshold level of institutional quality is
given by the following expression:
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To estimate our model we apply the Generalized-method-
of-moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic panel
data. The GMM estimators are well designed to correct the
drawbacks of previous technique of estimation (OLS):
simultaneity and omitted bias.3.2. DataFinancial development indicators are extracted from the
Beck, Demirguç-Kunt, and Levine (2000) revised database.3
Our data covers a sample of 18 MENA countries.4,5
We collected from the World Development Indicators
(World Development Indicators, 2008) database other in-
formation related to control variables, such as macroeco-
nomic stability, trade openness …. However, the data is
unavailable for a uniform period of time for each country.
Therefore, the number of observations is expected to vary
across countries leading to estimations over an unbalanced
panel data.
3.2.1. Data on financial development
We consider four indicators for banking sector develop-
ment and four indictors for stock market development.
The banking sector indicators are: (i) Private Credit
(PRIVCRE) equals banking institution credit to private
sector as a percent of GDP. It is considered to be an indi-
cator for financial intermediaries' activity (Demirgu¨ç-Kunt
& Levine, 1996). (ii) Liquid Liabilities (LIABILITIES) is
the ratio of liquid liabilities of the financial system (cur-
rency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks
and non-bank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. It is
a general indicator for the size of financial intermediaries
relative to the size of the economy. (iii) Bank Assets (AS-
SETS) equals the ratio of the total assets of deposit money
banks divided by GDP; it provides a measure of the overall
size of banking sector. (iv) A Bank Index (BANKINDEX)6
which is an index of banking sector development that ag-
gregates the information contained in the individual
indicators.
The stock market indicators are: (i) Market Capitalization
(MCAP) as an indicator of market size which is equal to the
ratio of value of domestic equities (traded on domestic ex-
changes) to GDP; (ii) Total Value Traded (TRADED) as a
measure of stock market liquidity which is equal to the total
value of domestic equities traded in each country's major
stock exchanges as a percentage of GDP; (iii) Turnover ratio
(TURNOVER) is, also, a measure of stock market liquidity. It3 The financial structure database is as updated in November 2008.
4 Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, Yemen.
5 When stock market data is considered, the sample contains only 13 MENA
countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates.
6 Detailed calculations are presented in Appendix A.is equal to the total value of domestic shares traded divided
by market capitalization. (iv) a Market Index (MARKET-
INDEX) which is an index of stock market development that
aggregates the information contained in the individual
indicators.
All indicators of financial development are expected to be
linked positively to economic growth.
3.2.2. Data on other variables
To assess the strength of the independent link between
financial development and economic growth, we control for
other potential determinants of economic growth in our
regression. Specifically we consider the most used variables in
the empirical growth theory defined as follows: (i) Initial level
of development (IIC) equals the logarithm of initial income
per capita and provides evidence of any convergence effects;
(ii) Trade Openness (TO), proxied by the ratio of the sum of
exports and imports to GDP since the empirical growth liter-
ature has shown that openness to international trade is an
important determinant of economic growth; (iii) Government
Consumption (GC) where we control for the level of govern-
ment consumption by using the ratio of government con-
sumption to GDP; and (iv) Inflation (INF) proxied by the
annual inflation rate which is included as an indicator for
macroeconomic stability.
To measure institutional quality we construct a composite
index of institutional quality using the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) variables from the Political Risk Services
(PRS) Group. The composite index is the sum of five in-
dicators which are: (i) quality of bureaucracy (ranges 0e4)
which measures institutional strength, quality of bureaucracy
and the autonomy from political pressure; (ii) law and order
(ranges 0e6) which reflects the strength and impartiality of
the legal system and popular observance of the law; (iii)
corruption (ranges 0e6) which refers to corruption in the
political system. Countries, with low levels of corruption,
have high index values and vice versa. (iv) Democratic
accountability (ranges 0e6) which measures how responsive a
government is to its people; and (v) investment profile (ranges
0e12) which is an assessment of factors affecting the risks to
investment which are not covered by other political, economic
and financial risk components. To enable comparability we
standardize all sub-indicators of our institutional index to
range between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate higher
quality.
4. Empirical results
We use the GMM estimators developed for dynamic panel
data for a sample of 18 MENA countries over the period from
1984 to 2007. Appendix B Tables present equations with
annual data estimated using the Blundell and Bond (1998)
dynamic panel data estimation technique, i.e. two-step sys-
tem GMM estimations. In addition, we use four-year average
data to prevent any biased estimates and to abstract from the
business cycle phenomena. This transformation entails the
existence of four-year periods of data for all countries
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2000e2003, 2004e2007) which make for six non-overlapping
periods. In the Tables of Appendix B, we report the GMM
estimates based on four-year average variables. Table 1 pro-
vides the descriptive statistics.
The GMM system regressions satisfy both the Sargan test
of over-identifying restrictions and the serial correlation test.
In all our model specifications, the Hansen test cannot reject
the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. Moreover,
the AR2 test fails to reject the null hypothesis that there is no
second order autocorrelation in the differentiated residuals.4.1. Institutional quality and the bankegrowth
relationshipTable 2 reports the results of regressions analyzing the ef-
fect of institutions on the relationship between banking sector
and economic growth. In columns 1 and 2, the composite
index BANKINDEX is included as the indicator of banking
sector development with the interaction term BANK-
INDEX*INST. The estimated results show that while
BANKINDEX remains significantly negative, the additional
interaction variable (BANKINDEX*INST) is significantly
positive suggesting that institutional development may miti-
gate very well the negative effect of BANKINDEX. Namely,
while an increase in the BANKINDEX reduces growth, the
negative effect is reduced in countries with more developed
institutional environments. Our results are similar both when
the equation is estimated using annual data or four-year
average data. The results illustrate that, in order for bankingFig. 1. Marginal effect of BANKINDEX on economic growth. AL ¼ Algeria, BA
LE ¼ Lebanon, LI ¼ Libya, MO ¼ Morocco, OM ¼ Oman, QA ¼ Qatar, SA ¼ S
Emirates, YE ¼ Yemen.sector development to contribute to economic growth and
when we base on annual data estimates, MENA countries must
possess a level of institutional development greater than the
threshold level of .55 (.58/1.06 ¼ .55) (Table 1 column 1).
Based on estimates using four-year average data, the corre-
sponding threshold is .66 (.129/.194 ¼ .66) (Table 1
column 2).
The negative effect of banking sector development on eco-
nomic growth in the MENA countries is significant because of
the low level of institutional development in this region (the
average value of institutional quality in MENA countries is .52
which is lower than the .55 and .66 threshold levels seen from
the estimations with annual and four-year average data
respectively).
Tunisia (as an example) increased the level of
banking sector development from -.007 to .10 between 1989
and 2007. Given that its institutional level of .52 is much
lower than the threshold of .66, the increase in
banking sector development would reduce the annual
growth rate by .003% (.003% ¼ [.129 þ (.194*.52)]
(.10 þ .007)). On the other hand, Israel (where the average
value of institutional quality (.76) is greater than the
threshold level (.66)) would benefit on average from
banking sector development.
Fig. 1 represents the marginal effect of a one unit in-
crease in BANKINDEX on economic growth based on each
country's INST value. The countries are placed in order of
magnitude of the total effect of a one unit increase in
BANKINDEX. Only in Israel does banking sector devel-
opment have a positive effect on economic growth because¼ Bahrain, EG ¼ Egypt, IR ¼ Iran, IS ¼ Israel, JO ¼ Jordan, KU ¼ Kuwait,
audi Arabia, SY ¼ Syrian Arab Republic, TU ¼ Tunisia, UAE ¼ United Arab
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On the other hand, the underdeveloped institutional infra-
structure of the rest of MENA countries may hamper eco-
nomic growth.
Looking at the measures of banking sector development,
LIABILITIES, ASSETS and PRIVCRE, in most regressions,
the institutional variable displays similar results to those when
banking development is proxied by BANKINDEX. In fact, the
three interaction terms (LIABILITIES*INST, ASSETS*INST
and PRIVCRE*INST) are significantly positive when we
consider annual data (Table 1). The coefficients for LIABIL-
ITIES and ASSETS are significantly negative and suggest that,
while a larger and deeper banking system reduces growth, this
negative effect is reduced in countries with more developed
institutional environments. On the other hand, when we look at
estimates based on four-year average data, we find that, while
the results are consistent with results of annual data for LI-
ABILITIES, the coefficients for both ASSETS and the inter-
active term ASSETS*INST do not appear to be statistically
significant in Table 2, the last line illustrates that, when the
indicator LIABILITIES is considered, the respective threshold
levels are .53 and .42 for the annual and four-year average
data.
Considering the proxies of banking sector activity (PRIV-
CRE), the results, displayed in Table 2 columns 7 and 8
indicate that the coefficients of PRIVCRE are negative but no
longer significant. On the other hand, when we use respec-
tively annual and four-year average data, the coefficients of
(PRIVCRE*INST) are positive and significant at the 1% and
10% levels (1.52 and .73). The consistent threshold levels of
institutional quality are .56 for annual data and .55 for aver-
aged data.
Tables 3e7 summarize the results of the regressions run
with each of the components of the institutional index7
including individually and interactively (i.e. FD*BURO,
FD*CORR, FD*DEMOC, FD*LAW and FD*INVEST). The
main findings suggest that not all dimensions of the institu-
tional framework have the same direct importance for bank
growth. In fact, while BURO, LAW and INVEST display
qualitatively the same results as those regressions with INST
(Table 2), in most regressions including all indicators of
banking sector development, CORR does not matter in the
banking sector growth nexus.8
Generally, when we refer to BANKINDEX, banking
sector development leads to economic growth only when,
based on annual data, the measures of BURO, LAW and
INVEST are higher than the threshold levels (.60, .68, .54
respectively) when. When the four-year average dataset is
considered, the consistent thresholds are .60, .57 and .59
respectively.
Democratic accountability (DEMOC) seems to matter only
when BANKINDEX is considered. Namely, to benefit from7 Quality of bureaucracy (BURO), law and order (LAW), corruption
(CORR), democratic accountability (DEMOC) and investment profile
(INVEST).
8 We do not find an important significance in the interaction terms of
banking sector indicators and CORR.financial intermediaries' development, MENA countries must
attain a score of DEMOC higher than the threshold levels (.49
and .55) when we consider respectively annual and averaged
data.4.2. Institutional quality and the stock market-growth
relationshipThe results of GMM estimators of economic growth on the
four indicators of stock market development and the interac-
tion terms between institutional indicators and the four in-
dicators of stock market development are reported in Table 8
using respectively annual and four-year average data.
Similar to banking sector regressions, the evidence from
Table 8 shows that, while the four proxies of stock markets
development remain significantly negative, the interaction
terms have a significantly positive effect on economic growth.
This evidence confirms the third possibility (as described
above) and suggests the importance of institutional quality in
mitigating the negative effect of financial development on
economic growth.
When we consider the estimations with four-year average
data, the results are consistent with those of the regressions
with annual data when we use MARKETINDEX and
TRADED as proxies of stock market development (Table 8).
In fact, the significantly positive coefficients of the interaction
variables (MARKET*INST and TRADED*INST) outline the
importance of institutional quality in mitigating the negative
effect of stock market on economic growth. However, the
coefficients of MCAP and TRNOVER and both the interaction
terms (MCAP*INST and TURNOVER*INST) are statistically
insignificant.
When considering MARKETINDEX, the results in col-
umns 1 and 2 of Table 8 illustrate that, in order for stock
markets to promote economic growth in the MENA region,
countries must have a level of institutional development
greater than the threshold level of .56 and .53 based on esti-
mates from respectively annual and four-year average data.
Building on these results, the significantly negative effect of
stock market development on economic growth in MENA
countries can be explained by the low level of institutional
quality in this region. This is lower than the threshold levels
(.56 and .53 for estimates with annual and four-year average
data respectively).
When we refer to TRADED, the corresponding thresholds
are .59, .52 based on annual and averaged data respectively.
The visual picture of the marginal effect of a one unit in-
crease in MARKETINDEX, based on each country, is depic-
ted in Fig. 2. As seen with BANKINDEX, countries, which
demonstrate the positive effects of stock market development,
are those countries, such as Israel,9 which have attained the
threshold level of institutional development. On the other
hand, as is the case of most MENA countries (for example,9 Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2007) argue that considering market capital-
ization Israel is the most promising markets in the MENA region.
Fig. 2. Marginal effect of MARKETINDEX on economic growth.
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institutional infrastructure may hamper economic growth.
We do not find statistical support of the view that a well-
developed institutional environment promotes economic
growth. When we consider both the banking and stock markets
development indicators, the institutional indicator comes with
a sign which, in most regressions, runs counter to theoretical
predictions.
Looking at the regressions run with each of the components
of the institutional index (INST), our results (Tables 9e13)
show that only the coefficients of INVEST appear to be
qualitatively the same as those of the regressions with INST
(see Table 13). Thus, stock market development can promote
economic growth only when the INVEST measure is higher
than the threshold level .85 based on the regression with
MARKETINDEX. When we consider MCAP, TRADED and
TURNOVER, the corresponding thresholds are .77, .57, and
.91 respectively (when based on annual data). Based on four-
year average data, the threshold levels for MCAP and
TRADED are .47 and .78 respectively (Table 12).
While they appear relevant in the bankegrowth nexus,
BURO, DEMOC and LAW do not matter in the stock market-
growth nexus. These results can be explained by the fact that,
in the MENA region, stock markets are in their infancy.
Generally, in MENA countries, INVEST is the most relevant
indicator of institutional quality in the financeegrowth nexus.
In summary, our main findings are that the coefficients of
financial indicators alone have a negative sign. However the
interaction terms have significant positive coefficients in most
regressions. This suggests that financial development alone
may hamper economic growth and it can be avoided only ifthe countries are characterized by a reasonable level of insti-
tutional quality. Namely, while an increase in the level of
financial development reduces growth, the negative effect is
lessened in a country with good institutional quality. Our re-
sults are in line with the strand of literature which suggested
that the non-positive results of the financeegrowth relation-
ship might be largely a product of certain changes in some
particular conditions. For example Rousseau and Wachtel
(2000) reported that, in countries with high inflation, the ef-
fects of finance on growth weakened Similarly, Minier (2003)
postulated that a positive correlation between stock market
development and growth did not appear to hold for countries
with low levels of market capitalization. Shen and Lee (2006)
concluded that the conditional variables of financial liber-
alization, high-income level, and good shareholder protection
mitigated evidently the negative impact of banking develop-
ment on growth. Namely, progress in banking development
either in a high-income country or in a country with good
shareholder protection or in a financially liberated country
facilitates growth.
Consequently, our results provide empirical evidence that,
given the low level of institutional quality in the MENA re-
gion, more finance may not generate significant benefit in
economic growth. Namely, in MENA countries, there is a
conditional relationship between financial development and
economic growth and institutional quality affects the finan-
ceegrowth nexus. Moreover, good institutions establish an
incentive structure which reduces uncertainty and promotes
efficiency and, hence, contributes to stronger economic per-
formance. Moreover, low level of ethnic tensions, good
governance, prevalence of law and order and good
Appendix B. Empirical results
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
GROWTH 346 .0111 .057 .428 .346
BANKINDEX 248 .036 .411 1 .945
LIABILITIES 238 .646 .235 .262 1.31
ASSETS 240 .590 .251 .089 1.35
PRIVCRE 239 .449 .228 .0439 1.02
MARKETINDEX 134 .011 1.383 .950 8.75
MCAP 182 .481 .486 .021 2.984
TRADED 183 .182 .408 .0007 3.496
TURNOVER 141 .292 .3511 .0089 2.31
IIC 343 3.519 .509 2.646 4.546
INF 331 .090 .180 .104 1.77
TO 355 .827 .341 .137 1.91
GC 317 .211 .0747 .01 .762
INST 376 .564 .128 .134 .938
10 This formula is also adopted by Ben Naceur and Ghazouani (2007) to
construct a composite stock market and banking indices.
11 X indicates variables PRIVCRE, LIABILITIES or ASSETS.
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financial development in promoting economic growth.
Namely, financial development and institutional quality can be
considered to be complements to promoting growth.
The more developed institutional environment mitigates the
negative effect of financial development on economic growth
in MENA countries. These results are in line with Levine et al.
(2000) who stressed that growth prospects were enhanced
because a sound legal environment encouraged the develop-
ment of financial intermediation. This supports strongly the
notion that institutional conditions are a significant factor. In
considering a sample of 72 countries for the period from 1978
to 2000, Demetriades and Law (2006) reported that financial
development had a larger effect on long-run economic devel-
opment when the financial system was embedded within a
sound institutional environment.
5. Conclusion
The relationship between financial development and eco-
nomic growth has long remained an important issue of debate
in the literature. Therefore, this paper aimed to re-investigate
the effect of financial development on economic growth in
MENA countries. Specifically, we examined whether or not
the results were affected by institutional quality. To this end,
we applied the GMM estimators developed for dynamic panel
data for a sample of 18 MENA countries over the period from
1984 to 2007.
Based on a model which introduced a linear interaction
between the indicator of financial development and institu-
tional index, we found that there was a conditional relationship
between financial development and economic growth. In fact,
institutional quality mitigates the negative effect of financial
development on economic growth when both the banking
sector and the stock markets are considered to be indicators of
financial development. Moreover, financial development and
institutional quality are complements to promoting economic
growth in the MENA region. In fact, financial development
can promote economic growth only in countries with sound
institutional environment. Moreover, the negative effect of
financial development on economic growth in the MENA re-
gion can be explained by the fact that most MENA countries
have not reached the level of institutional quality beyond
which financial development can act as a growth enhancing.
These results are in line with the findings of Demetriades and
Law (2006) who stressed the importance of institutional
quality in the financeegrowth nexus.
These results reflect on the policy implications. This
means that, in order to benefit from financial development in
terms of economic growth, the MENA countries' financial
systems have to be embedded in sound institutional frame-
works. As a main finding, investment profile seems to play a
vital role for all areas of financial development; hence, set up
a friendly business environment is of upmost importance, in
order to reduce investments risks, increase confidence and
attract foreign investors to boost economic growth. MENA
countries should adopt appropriate policy measures in orderto improve the business environment, develop a transparent
institutional and legal framework for the financial system. We
believe that sound institutions, strong legal system, de-
mocracy and low political instability (and hence low political
risk) is of key priority for MENA countries to allow their
financial systems to perform critical functions to enhance the
efficiency of intermediation and push output toward its
potential.Appendix A. The financial index calculation
We construct a conglomerate index of banking sector
development (BANKINDEX ) using a formula,10 which is
similar to the algorithm developed by Demirgu¨ç-Kunt and
Levine (1996). Specifically the construction of BANK-
INDEX follows a two-step procedure. First, for each country i
and each time t, transformed variables of private credit, liquid
liabilities and bank assets ratios are computed. We define the
transformed value of each variable X as follows11:
Xtit ¼

Xit X
X
 ðA1Þ
X is the average value of variable X across all countries in the
panel over the period of observation for each one. Second, we
take a simple average of the transformed value of private
credit, liquid liabilities and bank assets ratios obtained by
equation (A1) in order to provide the overall bank index
(BANKINDEX).
We use the three indicators of stock market development to
construct the overall stock market index SMINDEX based on a
formula that is similar to the one developed to obtain a bank
index (equation (A1) above).
Table 2
The effect of institutional quality on the bankegrowth relationship.
FD ¼ BANKINDEX FD ¼ LIABILITIES FD ¼ ASSETS FD ¼ PRIVCRE
(1) Annual data (2) 4-year Average
data
(3) Annual data (4) 4-year Average
data
(5) Annual data (6) 4-year Average
data
(7) Annual data (8) 4-year Average
data
BANKINDEX .581* (4.09) .129** (2.03)
LIQUIDLIABILITIES .456* (3.01) .547** (2.48)
BANKASSETS .708** (2.19) .051 (1.41)
PRIVATECREDIT .153 (.63) .401 (1.11)
INST .019 (.34) .188** (2.07) .554* (3.3) .967* (2.62) .990** (2.32) .242 (1.31) .992* (3.41) .348* (2.61)
BANKINDEX*INST 1.06* (5.11) .194*** (1.65)
LIQUIDLIABILITIES*
INST
.863* (3.31) 1.31* (2.68)
BANKASSETS*INST 1.49** (2.32) .024 (.27)
PRIVCRE*INST 1.52* (3.29) .739*** (1.85)
IIC .035 (1.01) .001 (.04) .0401 (1.49) .053 (.93) .084*** (1.92) .053 (1.37) .0049 (.08) .068* (3.20)
INFLATION .0006 (.04) .0084 (.37) .023** (2.09) .046* (3.25) .023 (.55) .0081 (.38) .187* (2.91) .016 (.27)
TO .024 (1.00) .016 (.73) .010 (.57) .008 (.35) .0013 (.04) .008 (.35) .0361*** (1.70) .0032 (.13)
GC .565* (2.86) .211*** (1.72) .471* (3.73) .558* (3.97) .836* (3.76) .555* (4.82) 1.17* (5.58) .456** (2.46)
cst .023 (.41) .066 (.68) .246** (2.06) .355 (1.13) .344 (1.26) .199 (1.27) .490*** (1.84) .0495 (.42)
AR(2) .664 .169 .703 .240 .719 .550 .645 .370
Sargan .245 .713 .591 .889 .692 .887 .075 .649
Hansen .516 .599 .691 .494 .991 .316 0. 399 .761
N 222 64 220 63 222 64 222 64
Threshold level of INST 55% 66% 53% 42% 48% na 56% 55%
Notes: N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. For Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Hansen statistic tests the validity of our
instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR(2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. T-statistics for coefficient in parentheses ***, **,
* refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 3
The effect of bureaucracy quality on the bankegrowth relationship.
Variable FD ¼ BANKINDEX FD ¼ LIABILITIES FD ¼ ASSETS FD ¼ PRIVCRE
(1) Annual data (2) 4-year Average
data
(3) Annual data (4) 4-year Average
data
(5) Annual data (6) 4-year Average
data
(7) Annual data (8) 4-year Average
data
BANKINDEX .367* (3.29) .104* (3.10)
LIABILITIES .708 (.85) .013** (2.14)
ASSETS .339 (.63) .042 (1.12)
PRIVCRE .699** (2.39) .122 (1.54)
BURO .090 (1.50) .0059 (.49) .650 (.93) .007 (.64) .452 (1.12) .009 (.33) .271** (2.69) .135*** (1.94)
BANKINDEX*BURO .613* (2.47) .174* (4.48)
LIABILITIES*BURO 1.22 (.98) .037* (38.36)
ASSETS*BURO .735 (.95) .001 (.04)
PRIVCRE*BURO .751** (3.01) .310*** (1.86)
IIC .054 (.94) .043 (1.13) .227 (.99) .003 (1.11) .147 (1.26) .050* (4.79) .115* (2.71) .024 (1.57)
INF .022 (.72) .161 (3.65) .074 (.90) .104* (5.92) .097*** (1.81) .141* (3.82) .075 (1.49) .178* (3.46)
TO .043** (2.80) .004 (.55) .067 (.93) .005 (1.47) .025 (.32) .0054 (.71) .058 (1.33) .004 (.43)
GC .206 (1.09) .346** (2.51) .646 (.61) .028 (.49) .850*** (1.93) .384* (9.66) .573** (2.70) .360* (3.46)
Cst .145 (.99) .068 (.65) 1.012 (1.00) .015*** (1.89) .527 (1.01) .086* (3.09) .037 (.33) .067 (1.52)
AR(2) .887 .653 .753 .362 .843 .845 .978 .580
Sargan .262 .885 .834 .694 .531 .980 .374 .911
Hansen .577 .184 .808 .460 .392 .783 .694 .272
N 210 60 208 54 210 59 210 .59
Threshold level of
BURO
60% 60% na 35% Na na 93% 39%
Notes: N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. For Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Hansen statistic tests the validity of our
instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR(2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. T-statistics for coefficient in parentheses ***, **,
* refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 4
The effect of corruption on the bankegrowth relationship.
Variable FD ¼ BANKINDEX FD ¼ LIABILITIES FD ¼ ASSETS FD ¼ PRIVCRE
(1) Annual data (2) 4-year Average
data
(3) Annual data (4) 4-year Average
data
(5) Annual data (6) 4-year Average
data
(7) Annual data (8) 4-year Average
data
BANKINDEX .042 (.79) .046 (1.66)
LIABILITIES .632 (.68) .185 (1.45)
ASSETS .001 (.02) .152 (1.01)
PRIVCRE .135 (.28) .135 (1.22)
CORR .0044 (.08) .029 (1.38) .673 (.60) .155 (.93) .099 (1.42) .236 (1.05) .089 (.26) .117 (1.27)
BANKINDEX*CORR .182** (2.72) .034 (.52)
LIABILITIES*CORR .699 (.41) .253 (.84)
ASSETS*CORR .186*** (1.81) .414 (1.15)
PRIVCRE*CORR .243 (.30) .273 (1.26)
IIC .0040 (.10) .052* (4.01) .235 (1.29) .0312 (1.76) .034 (.95) .113** (2.63) .044 (.56) .065* (3.15)
INF .002 (.16) .051 (1.58) .116 (.93) .010 (.24) .014 (.74) .077*** (1.93) .0041 (.13) .029 (1.19)
TO .022 (.80) .004 (.30) .275 (1.54) .009 (.46) .018 (1.27) .010 (1.14) .013 (.87) .002 (.29)
GC .348 (1.60) .408* (6.65) 1.15 (1.10) .254** (2.91) .367*** (1.85) .407* (5.26) .335 (1.60) .419* (8.18)
Cst .073 (.66) .080*** (1.94) .843 (1.61) .166 (1.50) .194*** (2.11) .389*** (1.99) .031 (.24) .187** (2.24)
AR(2) .672 .892 .796 .857 .674 .108 .760 .904
Sargan .074 .060 .804 .378 .573 .389 .217 .671
Hansen .770 .629 .429 .435 .498 .526 .719 .620
N 210 64 208 63 210 63 210 63
Threshold level of
CORR
23% na na na Na na na Na
Notes: N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. For Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Hansen statistic tests the validity of our
instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR(2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. T-statistics for coefficient in parentheses ***, **,
* refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 5
The effect of democratic accountability on the bankegrowth relationship.
Variable FD ¼ BANKINDEX FD ¼ LIABILITIES FD ¼ ASSETS FD ¼ PRIVCRE
(1) Annual data (2) 4-year Average
data
(3) Annual data (4) 4-year Average
data
(5) Annual data (6) 4-year Average
data
(7) Annual data (8) 4-year Average
data
BANKINDEX .288** (2.68) .164* (3.10)
LIABILITIES .145 (.56) .002 (.02)
ASSETS .0410 (.23) .037 (1.01)
PRIVCRE .110 (.42) .136** (2.24)
DEMOC .027 (.88) .0057 (.24) .021 (.11) .094 (1.32) .0150 (.06) .0113 (.14) .058 (.30) .167** (2.45)
BANKINDEX*DEMOC .595** (4.55) .299* (4.21)
LIABILITIES*DEMOC .039 (.12) .126 (1.00)
ASSETS*DEMOC .019 (.06) .0132 (.11)
PRIVCRE*DEMOC .164 (.44) .307** (2.39)
IIC .070 (.99) .027 (1.01) .009 (.20) .066** (2.56) .025 (.59) .0250 (.79) .016 (.28) .090* (4.00)
INF .029 (.81) .027 (.68) .031 (1.18) .0236 (.91) .005 (.30) .025 (.88) .0008 (.02) .076* (3.56)
TO .00007 (.00) .007 (.38) .047 (1.38) .0135 (1.10) .0119 (.56) .010** (2.43) .027 (.91) .002 (.28)
GC .889*** (1.98) .365* (3.09) .130 (.70) .422** (4.30) .313 (1.30) .280* (6.31) .290*** (1.99) .531* (12.57)
Cst .061 (.41) .019 (.33) .110 (.43) .118 (1.37) .015 (.10) .047 (.38) .0317 (.19) .131** (2.82)
AR(2) .929 .320 .834 .856 .805 .340 .765 .370
Sargan .172 .177 .863 .350 .572 .074 .591 .739
Hansen .568 .258 .939 .481 .839 .313 .771 .536
N 210 65 208 63 210 64 210 65
Threshold level of
DEMOC
49% 55% na na Na na na 45%
Notes: N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. For Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Hansen statistic tests the validity of our
instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR(2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. T-statistics for coefficient in parentheses ***, **,
* refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 6
The effect of law and order on the bankegrowth relationship.
Variable FD ¼ BANKINDEX FD ¼ LIABILITIES FD ¼ ASSETS FD ¼ PRIVCRE
(1) Annual data (2) 4-year Average
data
(3) Annual data (4) 4-year Average
data
(5) Annual data (6) 4-year Average
data
(7) Annual data (8) 4-year Average
data
BANKINDEX .159** (2.48) .200* (8.08)
LIABILITIES .243*** (1.78) .335* (3.27)
ASSETS .441*** (1.96) .022 (.73)
PRIVCRE .341* (4.07) .168 (1.09)
LAW .075 (1.20) .008 (.49) .291*** (2.00) .347* (3.84) .753*** (2.09) .006 (.44) .170** (2.78) .202** (2.30)
BANKINDEX*LAW .233* (3.92) .349* (11.08)
LIABILITIES*LAW .416*** (1.99) .566* (4.42)
ASSETS*LAW 1.33** (2.26) .0207 (.70)
PRIVCRE*LAW .427* (3.31) .451*** (1.94)
IIC .080 (.68) .045** (2.84) .115** (2.60) .086* (3.56) .187* (3.84) .0183 (1.72) .067** (2.80) .042* (4.31)
INF .015 (.90) .019 (.78) .031** (2.96) .032 (1.04) .044 (1.32) .023 (.84) .014 (.58) .036 (.211)
TO .010 (.39) .0061 (.56) .004 (.64) .011 (1.12) .074 (1.34) .0051 (.81) .011 (.38) .005 (1.26)
GGEX .177 (.36) .332* (5.24) .767* (3.17) .505* (4.47) .980** (2.21) .265* (9.01) .449* (4.71) .458* (8.18)
Cst .195 (.74) .097** (2.37) .069 (.57) .028 (.43) .130 (1.02) .0233 (.60) .010 (.14) .026 (.40)
AR(2) .703 .194 .938 .272 .691 .313 .829 .384
Sargan .218 .062 .843 .397 .740 .247 .655 .993
Hansen .285 .305 .834 .341 .791 .551 .726 .910
N 210 65 208 63 210 64 210 64
Threshold level
of LAW
68% 57% 58% 60% 34% na 80% 40%
Notes: N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. For Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Hansen statistic tests the validity of our
instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR(2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. T-statistics for coefficient in parentheses ***, **,
* refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 7
The effect of investment profile on the bankegrowth relationship.
Variable FD ¼ BANKINDEX FD ¼ LIABILITIES FD ¼ ASSETS FD ¼ PRIVCRE
(1) Annual data (2) 4-year Average
data
(3) Annual data (4) 4-year Average
data
(5) Annual data (6) 4-year Average
data
(7) Annual data (8) 4-year Average
data
BANKINDEX .179*** (1.84) .089* (3.45)
LIABILITIES .258** (2.79) .106 (1.30)
ASSETS .504* (3.39) .027 (.91)
PRIVCRE 1.07* (3.28) .151** (2.66)
INVEST .079 (1.04) .056** (2.70) .453* (3.56) .117 (1.59) .561* (5.34) .068 (1.77) .802** (2.64) .065 (.95)
BANKINDEX*INVEST .336*** (2.07) .152** (2.83)
LIABILITIES*INVEST .640* (4.27) .230** (2.59)
ASSETS*INVEST .941* (4.68) .032 (.63)
PRIVCRE*INVEST 1.68* (2.80) .265** (2.38)
IIC .107 (.92) .0018 (.09) .176* (3.19) .044 (.78) .123* (3.25) .025 (1.72) .115 (1.33) .0229 (.74)
INF .015 (1.13) .0011 (.05) .052* (3.68) .028 (1.50) .035 (1.67) .0008 (.06) .015 (.48) .005 (.19)
TO .050* (3.13) .0183* (3.28) .016 (.61) .001 (.06) .014 (.57) .0207** (2.86) .052 (1.65) .010 (1.07)
GC .227 (.46) .143 (1.51) 1.09* (3.93) .352 (1.53) .804* (3.82) .0413 (.72) .695** (2.41) .219 (1.30)
Cst .252 (.95) .012 (.26) .190 (1.55) .0214 (.14) .021 (.15) .0611 (1.35) .199 (.64) .002 (.04)
AR(2) .849 .063 .704 .955 .615 .114 .462 .052
Sargan .397 .088 .880 .390 .874 .205 .688 .485
Hansen .428 .601 .594 .585 .664 .232 .604 .388
N 210 65 208 63 210 64 210 64
Threshold level of INST 54% 59% 41% 47% 53% 84% 64% 57%
Notes: N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. For Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Hansen statistic tests the validity of our
instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR(2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. T-statistics for coefficient in parentheses ***, **,
* refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 8
The effect of institutional quality on the stock marketegrowth relationship.
FD ¼ MARKETINDEX FD ¼ MARKETCAP FD ¼ TRADED FD ¼ TURNOVER
(1) Annual data (2) 4-year Average
data
(3) Annual data (4) 4-year Average
data
(5) Annual data (6) 4-year Average
data
(7) Annual data (8) 4-year Average
data
MARKETINDEX .425* (2.73) .037 (1.40)
MARKETCAP 1.14*** (1.86) .1002 (.82)
TRADED .426** (3.54) .215*** (1.87)
TURNOVER 1.57** (2.41) .099 (.49)
INST .088 (1.13) .0923* (3.57) .119 (.91) .073 (.77) .128 (1.41) .061 (.44) .449 (1.11) .002 (.03)
MARKETINDEX*INST .761* (2.77) .072*** (1.77)
MARKETCAP*INST 1.855*** (1.89) .147 (.68)
TRADED*INST .747* (3.15) .415*** (2.01)
TURNOVER*INST 2.77** (2.37) .299 (.84)
IIC .025 (.42) .0065 (.13) .508*** (1.80) .066** (2.30) .133*** (1.88) .016 (.78) .174 (.93) .016 (.42)
INFLATION .171 (1.50) .228** (2.12) .701** (1.96) .130 (1.22) .081 (.59) .150 (.55) .026 (.10) .278** (2.09)
TO .0075 (.18) .022 (1.12) .101*** (1.91) .030** (2.54) .036 (.78) .023 (.75) .038 (1.23) .007 (.45)
GC .567** (2.18) .343 (1.26) .519 (1.13) .502** (3.26) .783** (2.45) .262* (6.16) 1.44*** (1.85) .365 (2.89)
Cst .182 (1.02) .0434 (.36) 1.747*** (1.86) .128*** (1.75) .190 (1.16) .072 (1.28) .084 (.15) .157 (1.11)
AR(2) .488 .533 .458 .695 .220 .495 .548 .274
Sargan .740 .292 .533 .497 .104 .597 .263 .625
Hansen .974 .251 .989 .863 .837 .503 .798 .755
N 222 42 145 45 152 44 222 43
Threshold level of
INST
56% 53% 62% na 59% 52% 57% na
Notes: N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. For Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Hansen statistic tests the validity of our
instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR(2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. T-statistics for coefficient in parentheses ***, **,
* refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 9
The effect of bureaucracy quality on the stock market growth relationship.
Variable FD ¼ MARKETINDEX FD ¼ MCAP FD ¼ TRADED FD ¼ TURNOVER
(1) Annual data (2) 4-year Average
data
(3) Annual data (4) 4-year Average
data
(5) Annual data (6) 4-year Average
data
(7) Annual data (8) 4-year Average
data
MARKETINDEX .020 (.25) .002 (.12)
MCAP .058 (.24) .0013 (.01)
TRADED .037 (.06) .330 (.89)
TURNOVER .203 (1.55) .100 (1.53)
BURO .094 (.82) .137 (1.38) .084 (.27) .058 (.15) .076 (.28) .487 (1.37) .173 (1.53) .068 (.89)
MARKETINDEX*
BURO
.044 (.26) .013 (.40)
MCAP*BURO .065 (.14) .014 (.03)
TRADED*BURO .033 (.03) .378 (.63)
TURNOVER*BURO .297 (1.48) .081 (.50)
IIC .073 (.48) .053*** (1.99) .023 (.35) .160** (2.20) .014 (.72) .435 (1.82) .202** (2.70) .007 (.17)
INF .177 (.76) .248*** (1.97) .183 (1.20) .093 (.47) .12 (.213) .683 (1.53) .012 (.12) .345** (2.68)
TO .023 (1.45) .027 (.70) .001 (.04) .030 (.66) .005 (.65) .059 (1.10) .015 (.29) .0224 (1.77)
GC .052 (.11) 1.04** (2.99) .417*** (2.18) .793* (4.76) .411* (4.21) 1.07 (1.79) 1.05* (3.96) .326** (2.70)
Cst .227 (.58) .042 (.50) .024 (.14) .324 (1.59) .005 (.04) 1.04*** (1.92) .367** (2.28) .048 (.30)
AR(2) .186 .361 .220 .746 .153 .935 .437 .927
Sargan .858 .479 .957 .947 .543 .130 .821 .485
Hansen .457 .897 .989 .983 .829 .920 .978 .961
N 144 42 135 43 142 44 144 43
Threshold level of
BURO
na na na na na na na na
Notes: N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. For Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Hansen statistic tests the validity of our
instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR(2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. T-statistics for coefficient in parentheses ***, **,
* refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 10
The effect of corruption on the stock marketegrowth relationship.
Variable FD ¼ MARKETINDEX FD ¼ MCAP FD ¼ TRADED FD ¼ TURNOVER
(1) Annual data (2) 4-year Average
data
(3) Annual data (4) 4-year Average
data
(5) Annual data (6) 4-year Average
data
(7) Annual data (8) 4-year Average
data
MARKETINDEX .130 (.98) .056** (2.82)
MCAP .399 (.96) .123 (1.43)
TRADED .258 (1.32) .012 (.13)
TURNOVER .129 (1.07) .021 (.69)
CORR .058 (.42) .169** (2.42) .375 (1.25) .150 (1.50) .176 (1.81) .057 (.77) .151*** (1.89) .054 (.49)
MARKETINDEX*
CORR
.320 (.93) .151** (2.65)
MCAP*CORR .820 (.89) .265 (1.22)
TRADED*CORR .766 (1.33) .089 (.32)
TURNOVER*CORR .347 (.94) .008 (.13)
IIC .055 (.42) .078 (.36) .0030 (.05) .040 (.33) .090** (2.38) .015 (.32) .0506 (.58) .145** (3.03)
INF .103 (1.17) .163 (.81) .309*** (2.05) .262 (1.30) .170*** (2.02) .300 (1.64) .067 (.62) .037 (.09)
TO .024 (.55) .0005 (.01) .016 (.33) .011 (.32) .037 (.81) .044*** (2.20) .004 (.20) .036 (1.01)
GC .206 (.24) 1.16*** (2.20) .274 (.97) .432 (.89) .652** (2.70) .323 (1.60) .378 (.57) .837** (2.83)
Cst .182 (.56) .090 (.14) .095 (.51) .086 (.28) .258 (1.82) .049 (.37) .139 (.75) .328** (2.47)
AR(2) .416 .200 .338 .722 .254 .309 .251 .609
Sargan .841 .088 .963 .734 .547 .185 .639 .296
Hansen .916 .868 .944 .759 .880 .940 .789 .914
N 144 42 144 43 138 44 144 43
Threshold level of
CORR
na 30% na na na na na na
Notes: N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. For Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Hansen statistic tests the validity of our
instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR(2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. T-statistics for coefficient in parentheses ***, **,
* refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 11
The effect of democracy accountability on the stock market growth relationship.
Variable FD ¼ MARKETINDEX FD ¼ MCAP FD ¼ TRADED FD ¼ TURNOVER
(1) Annual data (2) 4-year Average
data
(3) Annual data (4) 4-year Average
data
(5) Annual data (6) 4-year Average
data
(7) Annual data (8) 4-year Average
data
MARKETINDEX .130 (.98) .007 (1.02)
MCAP .631 (.72) .181 (.46)
TRADED .049 (.26) .024 (.45)
TURNOVER .146 (1.30) .053 (1.00)
DEMOC .058 (.42) .007 (.20) .432 (.80) .214 (.51) .157*** (1.90) .004 (.13) .162*** (2.14) .052 (.68)
MARKETINDEX*
DEMOC
.320 (.93) .023 (1.09)
MCAP*DEMOC 1.36 (.74) .404 (.52)
TRADED*DEMOC .229 (.43) .047 (.47)
TURNOVER*DEMOC .395 (1.15) .101 (.35)
IIC .055 (.42) .047 (.19) .185 (1.25) .051 (.92) .148** (3.00) .016 (.32) .041 (.47) .115 (.71)
INF .103 (1.17) .221 (.63) .128 (.58) .024 (.11) .227*** (2.21) .225 (1.25) .067 (.60) .150 (.56)
TO .024 (.55) .011 (.17) .008 (.51) .015 (.39) .034 (.65) .031* (3.51) .004 (.21) .035*** (1.97)
GC .206 (.24) .943*** (1.97) .035 (.03) .451 (1.43) 1.06* (3.27) .291 (1.53) .318 (.49) .603 (1.61)
Cst .182 (.56) .042 (.06) .859 (1.81) .049 (.22) .369** (2.30) .055 (.36) .122 (.64) .252 (.51)
AR(2) .416 .309 .387 .644 .257 .341 .258 .755
Sargan .841 .082 .988 .545 .708 .240 .738 .747
Hansen .916 .832 .962 .853 .988 .970 .910 .979
N 144 42 131 43 138 44 144 43
Threshold level of
DEMOC
na na na na na na na Na
Notes: N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. For Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Hansen statistic tests the validity of our
instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR(2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. T-statistics for coefficient in parentheses ***, **,
* refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 12
The effect of law and order on the stock marketegrowth relationship.
Variable FD ¼ MARKETINDEX FD ¼ MCAP FD ¼ TRADED FD ¼ TURNOVER
(1) Annual data (2) 4-year Average
data
(3) Annual data (4) 4-year Average
data
(5) Annual data (6) 4-year Average
data
(7) Annual data (8) 4-year Average
data
MARKETINDEX .076 (1.21) .006 (.36)
MCAP .070 (.14) .099 (1.67)
TRADED .450 (.46) .564 (1.75)
TURNOVER .049 (.34) .037 (.31)
LAW .376 (1.78) .058*** (1.88) .045 (.28) .014 (.45) .096 (.46) .015 (.33) .136 (1.64) .013 (.16)
MARKETINDEX*
LAW
.121 (1.39) .007 (.30)
MCAP*LAW .127 (.19) .133 (1.31)
TRADED*LAW .533 (.46) .662 (1.77)
TURNOVER*LAW .318 (1.41) .044 (.26)
IIC .156 (1.16) .069* (4.62) .012 (.13) .073 (1.34) .142 (.49) .008 (.15) .054 (.84) .023 (.12)
INF 1.92 (1.77) .204 (1.33) .170** (2.18) .179 (1.07) .067 (.27) .161 (1.27) .063 (1.04) .147 (.92)
TO .140 (1.52) .011 (.34) .0138 (.18) .029 (1.72) .010 (.26) .038 (1.72) .013 (.31) .037** (2.15)
GC .794 (.98) .935** (2.72) .519*** (1.95) .534*** (2.03) .847 (.63) .107 (.38) .757* (3.30) .289 (.32)
Cst .086 (.59) .007 (.11) .123 (.40) .089 (.62) .228 (.36) .094 (.76) .033 (.23) .049 (.10)
AR(2) .848 .607 .252 .618 .362 .332 .325 .559
Sargan .686 .066 .877 .502 .183 .380 .269 .559
Hansen .980 .882 .980 .817 .874 .510 .921 .491
N 144 42 135 43 142 44 144 42
Threshold level of
LAW
na na na na Na na na na
Notes: N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. For Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Hansen statistic tests the validity of our
instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR(2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. T-statistics for coefficient in parentheses ***, **,
* refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 13
The effect of investment profile on the stock marketegrowth relationship.
Variable FD ¼ MARKETINDEX FD ¼ MCAP FD ¼ TRADED FD ¼ TURNOVER
(1) Annual data (2) 4-year Average
data
(3) Annual data (4) 4-year Average
data
(5) Annual data (6) 4-year Average
data
(7) Annual data (8) 4-year Average
data
MARKETINDEX .154*** (2.03) .012 (.62)
MCAP .632*** (2.18) .123 (1.74)
TRADED .192 (.92) .412 (1.77)
TURNOVER .848** (2.26) .0004 (.00)
INVEST .017 (.38) .086 (.80) .335*** (1.84) .073 (.95) .209 (1.41) .099 (.94) .154 (.98) .205 (1.17)
MARKETINDEX*
INVEST
.180*** (2.11) .001 (.04)
MCAP*INVEST .813** (2.38) .267*** (2.33)
TRADED*INVEST .338*** (1.89) .526*** (1.87)
TURNOVER*INVEST .928** (2.38) .032 (.19)
IIC .225 (1.10) .003 (.11) .022 (.30) .031 (1.21) .255 (1.41) .068 (.79) .120 (.81) .126 (.86)
INF 1.45*** (2.04) .051 (.13) .365*** (2.08) .198 (1.30) .039 (.37) .362 (1.78) .004 (.03) .059 (.36)
TO .036 (.97) .052 (.93) .051 (1.19) .062** (2.50) .096 (.94) .029 (1.74) .012 (.32) .0003 (.01)
GC .264 (.86) .344 (.43) .144 (.47) .053 (.44) .015 (.03) .468 (1.27) .435 (.59) .370 (.54)
Cst .915 (1.36) .048 (.23) .283 (1.65) .205*** (1.95) .686 (1.14) .016 (.09) .159 (.53) .276 (1.05)
AR(2) .389 .556 .273 .437 .305 .988 .866 .953
Sargan .330 .186 .642 .066 .572 .595 .448 .553
Hansen .800 .985 .872 .912 .999 .877 .764 .738
N 144 42 135 43 142 44 144 43
Threshold level of
INST
85% na 77% 47% 57% 78% 91% na
Notes: N refers to number of observations included in the estimation. For Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Hansen statistic tests the validity of our
instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR(2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. T-statistics for coefficient in parentheses ***, **,
* refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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